Yes — every one of these laws is rooted in a constitutional value.

(a) Equal share for daughters and sons reflects the value of gender equality and justice — the conviction that economic rights cannot depend on sex. (Hindu Succession Amendment 2005 makes this concrete.)

(b) Different slabs of sales tax on different items reflect economic justice and equality of opportunity — basic items are taxed less; luxury items are taxed more, so that the burden is proportionate to capacity.

(c) No religious instruction in government schools reflects secularism and individual liberty of conscience — the state, funded by all citizens, must not promote any one faith.

(d) The ban on begar and forced labour reflects liberty and human dignity — no person can be reduced to a tool of another's will. This is constitutionally guaranteed by Article 23.

Why? Independence from colonial rule is achieved through political struggle, not through a constitution. A constitution is adopted after independence to organise the new state. Options (i), (ii), (iv) and (v) all describe genuine functions of a constitution in a democracy: limiting government, protecting minorities, embedding long-term vision, and enabling peaceful social change.

(i) Position (c) argues that the CAD are relevant today — because they preserve the reasons behind current constitutional practices. Position (b) argues that the CAD are not relevant — on the ground that the conditions then and now are different. Position (a) is a separate point about accessibility, not relevance — it neither affirms nor denies relevance.

(ii) The strongest position is (c). Indian society in its core values and challenges — majority/minority dynamics, federalism, equality, social justice — has not changed beyond recognition. When current practices are challenged, the CAD give us the reasons they were adopted, helping us defend them on principle rather than habit. Position (b) treats the past as foreign country; (c) treats it as a continuing conversation, which is closer to NCERT's view that “a history of our Constitution is still very much a history of the present.”

(a) Secularism. The dominant western model is ‘mutual exclusion’ — state and religion stay strictly out of each other's domain, and religion is treated as a private matter. Indian secularism is ‘principled distance’: the state stands at a moral distance from all religions but may intervene or abstain depending on which choice better promotes liberty, equality and social justice. Hence the Indian state can ban untouchability and aid minority schools — both within the same secular framework.

(b) Articles 370 and 371. American federalism is constitutionally symmetric — each state has identical legal status. Indian federalism is constitutionally asymmetric: Articles 370 and 371 (and 371-A to 371-J) gave special provisions to particular states (Jammu & Kashmir historically, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, etc.) to meet specific local needs — protection of customary law, restrictions on outside immigration, special administrative arrangements. Western federalism does not generally embed such formal asymmetry in the constitution itself.

(c) Affirmative action. India constitutionally entrenched caste-based reservations for SCs and STs in 1950 — recognising that mere formal equality is not enough to overcome age-old hierarchies. The U.S. began affirmative action only with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — almost two decades later, and not as a constitutional commitment but as legislation and executive policy.

(d) Universal adult franchise. Most western democracies extended the vote in stages — first to propertied men, then to all men, then (often only in the early or mid-twentieth century) to women and the working class. India adopted universal adult franchise at one stroke in 1950, with no property, literacy or gender filter, in a poor and largely illiterate society — a leap of faith that western democracies took centuries to make.

(d) The Indian Constitution recognises rights of religious groups — for example, the right to establish and maintain educational institutions (Articles 29–30). (e) The state has limited but real powers to intervene in religious affairs — for example, banning untouchability and opening Hindu temples to all classes — whenever liberty, equality and dignity require it.

Options (a), (b) and (c) are not adopted: the state is not strictly walled off from religion (so (a) is wrong), but neither does it have close ties with any one religion (so (b) is wrong), and it cannot discriminate among religions on grounds of belief (so (c) is wrong).

• a — iv (Liberal individualism): The freedom to criticise oppressive social treatment of widows is an exercise of individual freedom of thought and expression.
• b — ii (Procedural achievement): Reasoning over self-interest is precisely the deliberative procedural quality of the Assembly.
• c — i (Substantive achievement): Recognising community values is a substantive feature of the Indian Constitution's philosophy.
• d — v (Attention to a particular region): Articles 370 and 371 give special constitutional attention to specific regions (Jammu & Kashmir historically, North-East, etc.).
• e — iii (Neglect of gender justice): Unequal rights to women in family property and child custody are exactly what NCERT calls the gender-justice limitation.

The most defensible position is the one shared by Saba and Neha — with which Jayesh's charge does not survive on its own terms.

Saba is right that values like equality between men and women cannot be branded ‘western’ or ‘Indian’ in any deep sense. They are universal moral claims that humans have arrived at through different cultural routes. To reject a value only because of its geographical association is to commit the genetic fallacy — rejecting an idea because of where it came from rather than because of what it says.

Neha is right that the freedom struggle was against colonialism, not against everything British. The Indian people fought to choose their own system of government — and they consciously chose a parliamentary system because it suited a multi-religious, multi-lingual society where consensus across groups is needed.

NCERT's own answer to Jayesh: the borrowing was selective and creative. Universal franchise from day one, principled-distance secularism, asymmetric federalism and constitutional reservations are all distinctively Indian innovations — not borrowed photocopies but creative adaptations producing an ‘alternative modernity’.

Why the making is called unrepresentative: The Constituent Assembly was elected indirectly by the Provincial Assemblies, themselves elected on a restricted franchise (only about 15% of adult Indians could vote at that time). Most members came from the advanced sections of society. Only 15 women members were present. So in terms of voice — people speaking in their own language, not the language of masters — the Assembly fell short of full universal representation.

Does that make the Constitution unrepresentative? — No, not when judged honestly. NCERT distinguishes ‘voice’ from ‘opinion’. By the ‘voice’ standard the Assembly was unrepresentative; by the ‘opinion’ standard it was not, because a vast range of issues, social concerns and group interests were brought up in the debates. Members spoke not only from personal experience but in light of the perceived interests of various social sections. The Constitution has further earned its representativeness by being ratified by every general election since 1952 under universal adult franchise — and by the visible mass allegiance of common citizens, evident in the Ambedkar statues that stand in town squares across India holding the Constitution.

Evidence for the charge:

• At the time of drafting, daughters did not have an equal share in coparcenary (ancestral) property under classical Hindu law — corrected only in part by the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and substantially by the 2005 amendment.
• Personal laws on marriage, divorce, custody and maintenance still vary across religious communities, often disadvantaging women.
• The marital rape exception persisted in criminal law for decades.
• Only 15 women were members of the Constituent Assembly — the gender voice in the original drafting was limited.
• The Constitution did not initially mandate political reservation for women in Parliament or State Legislatures.

Provisions one could recommend today:

• An explicit constitutional guarantee of equal rights in family property, succession and matrimonial assets, regardless of gender or religion.
• Reservation of one-third (or one-half) of seats for women in Parliament and State Legislatures, mirroring the 73rd/74th Amendment reservations in local government.
• An explicit fundamental right against gender-based violence, including domestic and sexual violence.
• Statutory recognition of household labour and care work as economic contribution.
• A constitutional duty on the state to ensure parity in maintenance, guardianship and inheritance across all personal laws.

Yes — the statement carries genuine force. In a poor country, food, shelter, work, education and health are arguably the most basic conditions of dignified life. By placing them in the non-justiciable Directive Principles (Articles 36–51), the framers made them aspirational rather than enforceable — meaning citizens cannot directly sue the state for their non-fulfilment. This created a striking asymmetry: liberty and equality of citizens with food and shelter is meaningful in court; liberty and equality of citizens without food and shelter is far less so.

Possible reasons the framers chose Directive Principles:

• Resource constraint. A newly independent, poor state could not realistically guarantee a minimum income or housing to every citizen on day one. Making such guarantees justiciable would have made every government potentially liable in court for poverty itself.
• Policy flexibility. Directive Principles allow successive governments to interpret and pursue social goals through different policy mixes — planning, redistribution, market-based growth — rather than locking in one model.
• Judicial enforceability problems. Socio-economic rights require positive provision; their enforcement involves complex resource trade-offs that courts are not always best placed to make.
• Aspirational guidance. The framers saw Directive Principles as ‘fundamental in the governance of the country’ (Article 37), guiding legislation over time. Subsequent court rulings have read several of these into the right to life under Article 21 — bringing them, in effect, into the fundamental-rights fold.

In short, the limitation is real, but it has been progressively softened — through legislation (Right to Education Act 2009, MGNREGA 2005, Food Security Act 2013) and through judicial interpretation that reads dignity-related socio-economic guarantees into Article 21.

Constitution Day (Samvidhan Divas) is observed on 26 November every year, marking the day in 1949 when the Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution. Students typically take part in:

• Reading the Preamble aloud in school assembly — a national ritual since 2015.
• Speeches and quizzes on the framers, the seven core values, and the Preamble.
• Skits or role-play based on Constituent Assembly debates — especially Ambedkar's closing speech of 25 November 1949.
• Poster or essay competitions on themes such as ‘Living Constitution’ or ‘We, the People’.
• A short address by the principal or a guest speaker on the relevance of the Preamble to current issues.

You may write your own description with the actual events of your school: the date, the participants, what was read, who spoke, and what you personally took away from the day. The textbook's aim is to make the Constitution feel alive in your everyday school world — not as a museum object but as a shared vision you choose to keep alive.